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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Machine learning is  the process by which a computer  can learn to  make decisions
without being explicitly told what to do. When given a set of inputs as training data, a
machine learning algorithm will form a model, an internal representation, that allows it to
perform some future task.  We can make distinctions between the different  types of
learning algorithms,  one of  the ways being  the manner in  which they process their
training data.  More  specifically,  we distinguish  between ‘offline’ and ‘online’ learning
algorithms. An  offline learner has access to all of the training data at once. An online
learner only has access to a single sample at a time, and thus learns from a sequence
of inputs [1, 2].
Additionally, we can categorize machine learning tasks into three different kinds:
supervised,  unsupervised,  and  semi-supervised.  Speaking  generally,  supervised
learning deals with labeled data, and unsupervised learning deals with unlabeled data.
For supervised learners, “the goal is to learn a mapping from x to y , given a training set
made of pairs (xi, yi)” [3]. It is often used for classification and regression problems. On
the other hand, if we have an unlabeled dataset X, then goal of unsupervised learning is
to  find  interesting  structures  in  X.  While  it  has  applications  in  problems  such  as
clustering and dimentionality reduction, Chapelle et. al. point out that “the problem of
unsupervised learning is fundamentally that of estimating a density which is likely to
have generated X”. As the name suggests, semi-supervised learning is somewhere in-
between supervised and unsupervised learning; it utilizes both labeled and unlabeled
data. 
Artificial learners are, in general, vulnerable to adversarial attacks. An entity that
wishes to harm or evade an unguarded system’s decision-making capabilities can do so
with relative ease. This scenario is the focus of the field of adversarial machine learning
[4]. More formally, adversarial machine learning is where a machine learning system is
in  an  adversarial  environment  –  one in  which  it  is  challenged by  some adversarial
opponent. For example, if  the task of the learner was to classify input samples, the
opponent can alter legitimate input samples in order to cause the learner to misclassify
the input.  In fact, machine learning systems can, and often are, trained to generate
adversarial  inputs to use against  such a learner.  These adversarial  inputs are often
referred to as “adversarial examples”. When talking about adversarial machine learning,
we  will  refer  to  the  attacker  as  the  “adversary”,  and  the  defender  as  the  “target”.
Although measures can be taken to protect a machine learning system, the protection is
not total and not ensured to last. This remains an open problem, largely due to the
transferability of adversarial examples [5]. This is explored further in the next chapter.
Generally,  adversarial  machine  learning  is  applicable  wherever  there  is  a
machine  learning  system  that  is  accessible  to  would-be  attackers.  Notably,  it  has
applications  in  biometric  verification,  spam  detection,  malware  detection,  and  the
detection of network intrusions  [4, 6]. If a classifier is not protected from adversaries,
then it is very susceptible to their attacks, which can result in a misclassification rate of
over 96% in some cases [5]. Online machine learning systems are susceptible to being
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corrupted over time, and have been shown to become more inaccurate as the number
of adversarial samples increases [7]. Additionally, it has been shown that it’s possible to
fool autonomous robotic patrolling by using game-theoretic approaches [8].
One way to influence learners is through the use of adversarial perturbations. An
adversarial perturbation is an alteration of a sample, such that the changes results in
some  furthering  of  the  adversary’s  goals,  like  in  the  crossing  of  a  classification
boundary, for example. These perturbations are an effective strategy at both train and
test time [9].
Adversarial attacks can fall into one of three categories: evasion, exploratory, or
poisoning  attacks  [10].  Evasion  attacks seek  to  have  samples  misclassified  by  the
target. Using an example of a spam filter, the adversary might be trying to get spam
emails misclassified, and thus they would not be filtered out. Exploratory attacks seek to
gain information about the target that would otherwise be hidden, such as whether or
not a specific sample was used to train the target model. Poisoning attacks attempt to
damage the integrity or performance of the target. In data stream learning this is often
called adversarial drift [11]. 
There are also two types of specificity: attack specificity and error specificity [10].
The attack specificity can either be targeted or  indiscriminate. A targeted attack would
intend for a specific set of samples to be misclassified, whereas an indiscriminate attack
does not care this. The error specificity can either be specific or generic, meaning the
attacker wants the samples to be misclassified as either a specific class or any class,
respectively. Continuing with our example of a spam filter: an adversary could perform a
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poisoning attack that is  targeted at all emails addressed to “human resources” which
contain  the  text  “sexual  harassment”,   and  aims  to  have  those  emails  classified
specifically as spam. This is an example of a targeted attack with a specific error. This is
also an example of an adversary who has no redeeming qualities.
This thesis explores the currently intractable problem of transferable adversarial
examples and a barely explored approach that might be the solution. One of it’s goals is
to  help  unify  the  various  tangents  of  research  by  highlighting  the  many  research
opportunities available, as well as demonstrating that practical testing of these concepts
is  feasible.  We echo the  sentiment  of  other  researchers  calling for  attention  to  this
emerging field of study. This thesis hopes to draw that attention.
The following contributions have been made to satisfy the graduate requirements
for Masters in Software Engineering:
• A published paper which surveys the current landscape of research in adversarial
machine learning.
• A case  is  made  for  a  dynamic  approach  to  combat  transferable  adversarial
examples.
• An  experiment  which  tests  the  minimal  case  of  a  dynamic  defense  against
transferable adversarial examples.
• Several deficiencies are identified within this emerging field of study.
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CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORKS
In this chapter, we review research, both our own and other’s, which are relevant to this
discussion. We first provide an overview of our survey’s findings. Then, review the work
that has been done regarding transferability, as well as the emerging field of dynamic
models and defenses.  Finally, we review the work related to the algorithms used in our
experiment.
2.1 Adversarial Machine Learning Survey
In  preparation  for  the  thesis  proper,  we  conducted  a  survey  [12] of  the  field  of
adversarial machine learning which adapts the categorization used in a survey done by
Kumar and Mehta of IBM Research, India [13]. In it, we survey the current landscape of
research in this field, and provide analysis of the overall results and of the trends in
research.
2.1.1 Methodology Overview
Our process for categorizing the research papers was the following:
1. Collect the top 100 results from the sources, using the phrase ‘adversarial machine
learning’ as the search query.
2. Review each paper.
3. Sort each paper into categories.
4. Tally the raw values of each category.
5. Tally  the  per-year  values  of  each  category  (excluding  Cornell  Digital  Library
[https://arxiv.org/]).
6. Visualize the data with charts.
2.1.2 Collection
In this study we have used multiple collection sources to get a robust data set. The
sources we used were ACM Digital Library, IEEE Xplore Digital Library, Springerlink,
Cornell  Digital  Library,  and  Sciencedirect.  Since  we  are  focused  on  newer
developments within this field of research, we restricted our data collection to the past
ten years (2007-2017).
2.1.3 Evaluation
All  papers  were  filtered  and  categorized  manually.  We  filtered  out  book  chapters,
conference posters, and those papers which were unrelated to the subject matter. We
used the categories in such a way,  that  a paper can appear in multiple categories.
Some papers were categorized as a top-level category, but did not fit into any of its
subcategories. We tallied these papers in their own subcategory that is independent of
the other subcategories.
The histograms for each category exclude the results from Cornell Digital Library due to
the fact that the earliest published papers are from 2015, and so including these results
would heavily skew the graph.
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2.1.4 Results
The raw paper counts for the categories are shown in Figures 2.1 - 2.6.  Figures 2.1 -
2.3 show the counts for top-level categories, while Figures 2.4 - 2.6 show the counts for
each type of attack.
Figure 2.1: Count of papers for “Applications” Figure 2.2: Count of papers for “Evasion Attacks” 
sub-category
Figure 2.3: Count of papers for “Approaches” Figure 2.4: Count of papers for “Exploratory 
Attacks” sub-category
Figure 2.5: Count of papers for “Attacks” Figure 2.6: Count of papers for “Poisoning Attacks”
sub-category
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2.1.5 Raw Count Data Analysis
From Figures 2.1 - 2.6 we can see the following:
• “Spam Detection” is by far the most popular application, with ~41% of papers
exploring the topic.
• "Making Classifiers Robust" and "Game-Theory Based Approaches" are the most
common approaches,  making up approximately  51% and 34% of  the papers,
respectively.
• ~76% of papers discussing attacks focus on "Evasion" attacks.
• Regarding  evasion  attacks,  the  most  explored  topic  was  "Adversarial
Classification",  having ~49% of papers which discuss it.  There were also the
topics of “Adversarial Examples” and “Generative Adversarial Networks” which
were somewhat popular, at ~20%, each.
• Regarding exploratory attacks, the most explored aspect was "Model Extraction
Using Online APIs", which made up ~45% of papers in that category.
• For  the  “Ill-Fit”  category,  we  see  that  “Poisoning  Attacks”  has  the  largest
proportion of ill-fit papers, with ~27% falling into the sub-category. However, it is




The counts per year can be seen in Figures 2.7 - 2.12. These figures are a subset of all
the  trends  which  were  analyzed.  For  the  sake  of  readability  and  brevity,  we  have
included the most noteworthy trend charts in this paper, and excluded those which had
sparse or sporadic paper counts.
Figure 2.7: Paper counts by year for 
“Spam Filters”.
Figure 2.8: Paper counts by year for 
“Game-Theory Approaches”.
Figure 2.9: Paper counts by year for 
“Making Classifiers Robust”.
Figure 2.10: Paper counts by year for 
“Adversarial Classification”.
Figure 2.11: Paper counts by year for 
“Biometric Verification and 
Authentication”.
Figure 2.12: Paper counts by year for 
“Evasion Attacks”.
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2.1.7 Trends Data Analysis
By looking at the breakdown of each category’s paper-counts by year, we can see the
following trends in Figures 2.7 – 2.12:
• "Spam Filters" had a large spike in 2008, before declining, and then rising slightly
in popularity.
• "Game-Theory Based Approaches" had a large spike in 2010, before lowering
and remaining stable.
• "Making Classifiers Robust" has been a consistently explored topic since 2008.
• Evasion attacks have had steady interest since 2008, with a sharp rise within the
past 2 years.
• "Adversarial Classification" has had steady interest since 2008.
• And finally, we see in  Figure 2.13 the 10-year trend in the topic of Adversarial
Machine Learning as a whole.
10
Figure 2.13: Paper counts by year for research in Adversarial 
Machine Learning
Together, these charts show an initial wave of interest, which initially peaks in 2010.
Interest in the field levels off for a few years, but then begins to steadily gain more and
more interest from 2013 onward.
2.2 Black-Box Attacks and Transferability
Szegedy et. al.  first  observed the transferability of  adversarial  samples between two
deep neural networks  [14]. With these findings, Papernot et. al. explored the concept
further,  developing  several  black-box  attacks  to  demonstrate  the  phenomenon  of
“adversarial  example  transferability”  [5].  There  are  three  key  components  of  this
technique. 
1. A target classifier is used as an oracle for the adversary. It receives unaltered
samples and gives the prediction to the adversary.
2. The adversary uses these predictions to train a substitute model. By training from
the target’s  predictions,  the substitute  learns an approximation of  the target’s
decision boundaries.
3. The adversary uses white-box knowledge of the substitute to craft adversarial
examples  from samples  in  the  dataset.  The examples  are  crafted  by  adding
adversarial perturbations  in the direction of the decision boundary hyperplane.
Using  this  method,  the  adversary  can  now  effectively  evade  the  target’s  classifier,
despite only having black-box access. The reason this works is because adversarial
examples are transferable between architectures  [6]. The property of transferability is
not fully understood, though it is thought that it may be caused by learning from the
same data distribution, which results in learning similar decision boundaries [15].
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This  method  of  attack  is  very  generalizable;  the  attacks  not  only  transfer  to
models  of  the  same  type,  but  also  across  many  different  types  of  models.  In  the
Papernot et. al. paper, the researchers demonstrate the effectiveness of the attack with
two different substitute models against oracles with the following models: decision tree,
logistic  regression,  support  vector  machine,  deep  neural  network,  and  nearest
neighbors.  They  go  on  to  show  the  attack’s  effectiveness  against  Amazon’s  and
Google’s Machine Learning as a Service platforms, without knowing what models or
learning techniques were being employed.
Since then, many attempts have been made to solve this problem [16]. However
a pattern has emerged: a new defense against these attacks is proposed, and it  is
shortly shown to be ineffective against a set of attacks that weren’t tested [17–19]. No
defense thus far has been sufficient to completely guard against the transferability of
adversarial examples, and so this is an open problem.
Fortunately, the researchers have implemented an example experiment of their
black-box attack in Cleverhans, which is a library for bench-marking adversarial attacks
and defenses  [6, 20]. This is a boon to researchers wanting to test defenses against
those attacks.
2.3 Dynamic Modeling
An  interesting  observation  can  be  made  regarding  the  research  into  adversarial
transferability: it seems to exclusively consider offline learning techniques as a defense.
In their 2019 paper, Goodfellow argues that dynamic models should be a new research
direction when examining defenses against adversarial examples at test-time [21]. He
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defines a dynamic model as one which changes each time it is run. The intuition here is
that a moving target is harder to hit.
Dynamic-Adversarial Mining is a new interdisciplinary field of study (see Figure
2.14) proposed by Sethi & Kantardzic which approaches the same problem, but from a
different angle [22]. They argue that machine learning models often assume that the test
environment is static, instead of looking at it like an arms race between attacker and
defender.  In addition, they show that the generalization of machine learning models
actively  opposes  their  security.  The  proposal  is  a  holistic  approach  to  stream data
mining, which takes into account the fact that test-time environments are dynamic and
adversarial. 
In another paper,  Sethi et. al. identify three views on evaluating the security of
models that operate in “dynamic real world environments” [23]:
• the difficulty of evading it’s classifier
• the detect-ability of changes in the data distribution over time
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Figure 2.14: Shows the gap that this new field of study aims to
fill. Adapted from [22].
• it’s ability to recover from model degradation
They propose a novel feature-hiding approach, which improves the model’s ability to
detect attacks, and conclude by marking the following as core ideas under this new field
of study, as quoted from the paper:
• “Ability to leave feature space honeypots in the learned classifier at training time,
to efficiently detect attacks using unlabeled data at test time.
• Semi  automated  self  aware  algorithms,  which  can  detect  abnormal  data
distribution shifts, at test time.
• Maintaining multiple backup models, which can provide prediction when the main
model gets attacked.
• Ability to use a stream labeling budget effectively and to distribute the budget
appropriately, to detect and fix attacks. Thereby, managing human involvement in
the process.
• Understanding  attack  vulnerabilities  on  classifiers,  from  a  purely  data  driven
perspective, to effectively test the security measures employed.”
2.4 Online Semi-Supervised Learning
For our experiment, we needed a model that changed every time it was run, and so an
online model seemed like the natural choice. However, as Losing et. al. observe, there
is a lot of ambiguity when the terms “online” or “incremental” are used in research, since
they are often used interchangeably [24]. In their paper, they consider online learning to
be  a  type  of  incremental  learning,  one  which  can  learn  indefinitely  with  limited
computational resources available. In this sense, either an online or increment model
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would work. We decided that an online model would be the more desirable choice for
our needs since it seemed more realistic and applicable. The reasoning for needing a
“semi-supervised”  model is explained in chapter 3. We examined several candidate
models. The ideal candidate would be one that was already implemented in the target
language, Python; the alternative would be implementing the algorithm ourselves. In our
initial  search,  we  were  unable  to  find  a  Python  implementation  of  an  online  semi-
supervised  algorithm,  likely  due  to  the  ambiguity  stated  earlier.  We  decided  on
implementing  a  recently  published  algorithm  that  seemed  to  fit  the  needs  of  our
experiment. That algorithm was the Fast Model based Online Manifold Regularization
(FMOMR) algorithm [25].
FMOMR, as the name might suggest, is a fast variant of the MOMR algorithm,
which the authors proposed in a previous paper. They describe MOMR as a “manifold
regularized model in a reproducing kernel Hilbert space”. Figure 2.15 shows a diagram
which is an overview of how these kind of classifiers function. They use a solution to the
Lagrange dual problem in order to get the classifer at the next time step, which enables
the model to learn in an online manner. They use an approximate derivation of this
process for FMOMR, along with a buffering strategy to prevent the number of support
vectors from growing undoubtedly. For their testing, they compared both MOMR and
FMOMR  with  two  other  online  manifold  regularized  algorithms.  The  algorithms  are
based on Example-Associate Update (OMR-EA) and Overall  Update (OMR-Overall).
The test  sets used were MNIST, FACEMIT,  and the UCF YouTube dataset.  In their
results, they observe that the accuracies of their algorithms were comparable to the
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other online algorithms, and in the case of UCF, slightly better.  An implementation of
this algorithm was attempted, but was not able to meet the needs of our experiment. It
is uncertain whether the fault lies within the implementation or the algorithm. More on
this is discussed in the next chapter.
Figure  2.15:  Overview  of  manifold  regularized
online  semi-supervised  learners.  Adapted  from
[25].
In  searching  for  an  alternative  candidate  for  the  experiment,  we  found  the
Incremental Label Propagation (ILP) algorithm, which was already implemented in the
target language [26]. To quote the authors, “Our main idea is that when a new sample
arrives, many computation steps can be saved by propagating labels only locally and
stopping the propagation process if no significant change of labels is achieved.” They
denote  a  hyperparameter  θ  which  is  used  for  tuning  the  threshold  at  which  label
propagation stops. As θ is increased, the algorithm will become “constrained to act more
locally”. Conversely, when θ is set to zero, it will behave the same as an offline label
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propogation  algorithm  would.  They  tested  their  algorithm  on  the  KITTI  benchmark
dataset,  which  is  a  streaming  dataset  known for  it’s  challenging  computer  vision
benchmarks.  The researchers were able to outperform  Online Random Forests and
online multi-class Gradient Boost. In the “20% label” test case, they were also able to
outperform  the  Mondrian  Forest  algorithm.  Because  of  it’s  incremental  learning
mechanism, accessible tuning parameters, and the fact that it was already implemented
in the target language, ILP was an excellent candidate for our experiment. 
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CHAPTER 3: CHALLENGES
In order to test the hypothesis, we would need to do the following:
1. Find a suitable algorithm
2. Verify the algorithm’s correctness
3. Integrate the algorithm into the cleverhans transferability test
4. Run several experiments with varying parameters
There were many challenges associated with these steps.  In  this chapter,  we have
documented our experience with overcoming these challenges, with the hopes that it
will aid future researchers in this area. 
3.1 Finding a Suitable Algorithm
Due to the specific scenario being tested, we needed a learner that fit very specific
requirements.  Also,  because  we  were  adapting  an  example  from  the  Cleverhans
framework,  the  selection  of  learning  algorithms  was  additionally  constrained  by
integration requirements. The requirements are informally described below.
R1. The learner shall be a multi-class image classifier in order to integrate into the
Cleverhans example.
R2. The learner should be one which is already implemented in Python,  as it
would simplify the integration with the Cleverhans framework.
R3. The learner  shall  learn at  both train-time and test-time (online/incremental
learning), as this is central to the hypothesis.
R4. The learner shall be a semi-supervised learning algorithm.
The reasons for the first three requirements are stated plainly. However, the reasoning
behind R4 requires some explanation, which is done in the next chapter.
3.2 Finding an Online Semi-Supervised Image Classifier
While gathering the data for our literature survey, one thing we noticed was the
scarcity of online semi-supervised algorithms. So even finding a suitable algorithm was
a challenge. Of the few that were available, several were implemented in such a way
that  integration would  have been a major  hurdle,  and others  did  not  give sufficient
details to implement their  algorithm independently.  While we didn’t  find any suitable
algorithms  implemented  in  Python,  we  did  find  a  detailed  proposal  for  a  suitable
algorithm,  FMOMR.  We  were  unable  to  obtain  a  copy  of  the  implementation  the
researchers used, so we decided to implement the algorithm, ourselves.
3.3 Implementing the Algorithm
In  order  to  implement the algorithm ourselves,  we needed to  understand the
math behind it. While our search led us a bit too far into the theory behind the algorithm,
we were able to translate it to code. Additionally, there are some small inconsistencies
in the nomenclature between the descriptions MOMR and FMOMR which are never
addressed, and thus added to the difficulty of translating the algorithm into code.
During  this  time,  we  were  also  searching  for  the  best  tools  to  use  for  this
implementation. A major concern was the ease of integration with the Cleverhans code,
so we prioritized simplicity and quality of documentation. The libraries we decided upon
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were scikit-learn and numpy [27, 28], due to the aforementioned concerns, as well as
their apparent popularity within this field of study.
Here we will go through the FMOMR algorithm (see Figure 3.1), as described by
the authors, and discuss each line’s meaning and implementation implications. Starting
off, we see that the algorithm lists two of the hyperparameters as inputs,  λ1 and λ2. In
our implementation, however, we needed all four hyperparameters (λ1, λ2,  σk,  σw), and
so we used a member variable dictionary to cleanly access them when and where they
were needed. 
Figure 3.1: MOMR and FMOMR algorithms. Adapted from [25].
Lines 1-3 represent  the initialization of algorithm at time-step 1. At this point,
essentially, the classifier is just the kernel function on the first input sample. Line 4 sets
up the loop, where t represents the current time-step. One thing to note here is “ i ≤ T”.
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We believe this is a typo of “t ≤ T”, since there has been no variable "i" declared at this
point. Lines 5-6 are just receiving the input sample, and it's labeling information. Python
allows for default values in function declarations, so we were able to make the passing
of yt optional. This input, along with the loop, was trivial to implement.
In Line 7, the algorithm says to update the Gram Matrix K. However, K is simply a
matrix of kernel functions, so we stored xt in a buffer and, whenever K was needed, the
matrix elements would be calculated at that time. This was useful, since the buffer was
also needed to calculate the graph Laplacian. The kernel function they use is a Radial
Basis Function (RBF) kernel, which looks like this: k(xi, xj) = exp(−||xi−xj||2/(2σ2)). The σ
here is a hyperparameter. We implemented this function ourselves, as well as trying the
implementation in scikit-learn to confirm the correctness of our implementation.
At line 8, we append a zero to the α buffer from the previous time-step. We also
included a check for whether or not the α buffer was full,  and shifted the buffer as
necessary.
Lines 9-10 are for calculating the graph Laplacian. In  line 9,  we compute the
weight and degree matrices, according to the author's specification in  Figure 3.2. The
weight function they use for the elements in weight matrix W is also an RBF kernel. The
only difference between this and the Gram Matrix K is the sigma hyperparameter, which
is represented by σk and σw, respectively. Because of this, it was easy to implement a
function that worked for both matrices; we defined the method with an input variable
"sigma", along with the two sample inputs, as seen in Figure 3.3. In the code snippet,
“np” is the numpy library, whose math functions were a great aid to the implementation
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of this algorithm. In addition, the built-in matrix support of numpy's “ndarray” datatype
allows for simple, understandable matrix math. Instead of calling a function to subtract
W from D, we can just write "L = D - W", same as in line 10.
Figure  3.2:  Equations  17,23,  and 24.  Adapted
from [25].               
Figure 3.3: Code snippet of the implemented
RBF kernel function. 
Lines 11-17 represent a branch in the algorithm's logic. δt represents whether or
not a label was given with the sample. In [fig ___], this is represented by the diamond
containing “δt > 0”.  If  no label  was given,  line 12 would run, and only the manifold
structure would be updated. If a label  was given, then lines 14-16 would run, and the
result of a loss function would be combined with the update to the manifold structure.
In line 12,  we see that  we are computing  α using  αt,  whereas in the MOMR
version we calculate  αt using  α˜t. We made the decision to treat this as a typo, and
treated the α and αt as if they were αt and α˜t, respectively. Because we have already
calculated  L and  K by  this  point,  and  because  numpy  provides  an  identity  matrix
function, the rest of the computation is pretty straightforward.
In line 14, we get J by taking the last column of the gram matrix K. This was easy
to accomplish using Python's built-in list comprehensions: K[:,-1].  Line 15 is where we
compute the approximation of  γ.  Figure 3.2 shows equation 17 from the paper.  It's
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similar to line 12, with the main exception being that we are multiplying the transpose of
J and  the  label  with (I−λ2LK)αt.  One  thing  to  note  from  this  equation  is  that  it  is
calculating for the next time-step, whereas in the algorithm, we are trying to obtain α at
the  current  time-step.  This  discrepancy  between  the  equations  and  the  algorithm
caused  some confusion.  Essentially,  they  both  accomplish  the  same thing,  but  the
equations operate at time-steps t and t+1, whereas the algorithm operates at time-steps
t-1 and t. This means that the αt in equation 17 is actually αt-1 in the algorithm.
Line 16 is  where we compute  α  for  this  branch.  We already have  γt,  so we
compute (I−λ2LK)αt. The rest of the math here is straightforward, and thanks to numpy's
excellent support of matrix operations, the code looks clean and comprehensible. There
is  another  important  observation  to  make  here  for  lines  15-16:  they  both  use  αt-1.
Remembering line 12, it uses  αt. Which means, as the authors have written it,  α˜t is
never used. This is what led us to think it was a typo, since it would make no sense to
keep line 8 if it was never needed. Thus, we decided that we would use α˜t in both of
these cases, as well.
Lines 18-19 are where everything culminates. This is the function that will take in
an  input  and  calculate  it's  class.  It  does  this  by  summing  the  result  of  what  is,
essentially, an array of weighted similarity values between the input sample and those in
the buffer. By taking sign(f(x)) we get the binary classification of x at the current time-
step. Additionally, this means that the learning function and prediction function are not
intertwined; we can predict without learning, and learn without predicting. This allows for
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the algorithm to be run in an offline manner,  which was perfect for  our experiment.
Again, numpy's math functions made this very easy to implement.
3.4 Verifying the Correctness of the Implemented Algorithm
Testing  the  algorithm  comprised  many  challenges  in  and  of  itself.  Unit  tests  were
essential to verifying the transformations of the data, but they were lacking in one critical
area: they couldn’t verify if the algorithm was learning properly, due to a lack of any
oracle. The only way to test this was to test the algorithm as a whole. This is a known
issue with testing machine learning software [29]. Because of this, even small changes
required  retraining  and  retesting  the  algorithm,  and  caused  development  slow to  a
crawl.  This  was  made  even  worse  by  the  fact  that  some  combinations  of
hyperparameters do not converge on a solution. So, in order to determine if there is a
fault  in  the  implementation,  we  would  need  to  perform  hyperparameter  selection.
However, the hyperparameter selection, itself, relied upon the ability of the algorithm to
learn, which was difficult to verify because we didn’t know the optimal hyperparameters
for the dataset. This circular dependency was resolved by using the accuracy scores of
the hyperparameter selection process to see if, even for the “optimal” hyperparameters,
learning was taking place. 
Hyperparameter selection slowed testing significantly. In the FMOMR paper, the
authors suggest 7 different options for the two sigma values, and 8 different options for
the  two  lambda  values.  This  results  in  1008  possible  combinations  for  the
hyperparameters for a single Buffer-U value.  Using five-fold cross validation on 500
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samples, like the authors did, we train and test the learner 5040 times before we obtain
the optimal hyperparameters for the dataset. 
Another area of uncertainty regarded the precision of the data types used for
calculation, and how much they affected hyperparameter selection.  It was uncertain
whether a set of hyperparameters did not converge, or whether the precision of the data
type was causing a preemptive overflow or underflow. This implementation used a 128-
bit float, however other options were considered. Using a custom data type to represent
the matrix values was one option, but the time to execute a test was already at several
hours, even for simple data sets. The overhead of using a more complex representation
of the data would have caused development to grind to a halt, for what supposed to be
a simple proof of concept. A symbolic representation may have been another option, but
there  was  no  guarantee  that  it  would  resolve  the  issue,  and  the  effort  required  to
accomplish this would not be insignificant. 
Python’s built in unit testing framework was used to help streamline the testing of
individual methods. One of the biggest issues we faced was making sure that the data
was in the correct shape throughout the transformations on it, and this is where the unit
tests  were  the  most  useful.  We  were  able  to  test  the  more  simple  mathematical
functions that we implemented, but they were useless for validating whether learning
was taking place over several iterations. 
The algorithm was initially tested on a synthesized dataset whose samples were
low-dimensional  and  easily-separable,  and  then  scaled  up  to  more  complex,  less
separable data. Eventually, it was tested against the MNIST dataset. In order to do this,
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we needed create a pre-processing method in order reshape the data such that our
program could operate on it.  Despite  being able to  learn on simplistic  data,  as the
complexity of the data increased, the accuracy of the algorithm quickly dropped. The
algorithm, as implemented, was not suitable for the experiment. 
3.5 Finding Another Suitable Algorithm
This  was a huge setback,  considering the time and effort  expended.  An alternative
needed to be found, so we, again, sought out an already-implemented algorithm we
could  use.  We only  found one,  and  it  was  released while  we  was  working  on  the
FMOMR implementation. That algorithm was Incremental Label Propagation (ILP). We
were quickly able to verify for ourselves that the algorithm functioned as described, and
would be suitable for the experiment. Which only left a single challenge to overcome.
3.6 Integrating the Two Sets of Code
We needed to create an interface for ILP, so that it would be easily within the adapted
cleverhans code.  The next  chapter  details  the architecture of  this,  along with  more
details of the algorithm itself. However, the difficulties of creating that interface were less
significant than it’s integration into Cleverhans.
The Cleverhans example being used had one major caveat: it did not operate in
a procedural style; or at least, the operations for the learning process were written in a
declarative  style.  The  example  utilized  TensorFlow’s  graph  and  session  workflow,
meaning  that  a  graph  of  operations  upon  the  data  is  built,  with  the  data  being
represented symbolically in the form of “placeholders” [30]. The real data is fed into this
26
graph at some point in the future, and it is then that the data is operated upon. It made
integrating ILP,  which  did operate  procedurally,  an uncertain  task.  We were  able  to
resolve this difference, but only after digging much more deeply into the architecture of
TensorFlow than we had intended. We used a function that wraps an arbitrary python
function, so long as it conforms to the specified interface required. With the final barrier
overcome, the hypothesis could now be tested.
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CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENT
In this chapter, we discuss our experiment. We start with a breakdown of the problem,
and then go on to discuss how we utilized the Cleverhans library and integrated the ILP
library. Lastly, we cover the experiment setup and observe the results.
4.1 Problem Statement
The goal of this experiment was to examine the effectiveness of black-box attacks on a
dynamic model.   And by ‘dynamic model’, we mean a model changes through use.
Thus, we form the following hypothesis:  “If  a target model  learns from the samples
which  are  being  used  to  train  the  substitute  model,  then  the  adversarial  examples
crafted against the substitute will be less transferable to the target model.”
While the adversary is training the substitute model, they must send samples to
the  target  to  be  classified.  Regarding  the  label  of  those  samples,  there  are  two
possibilities:  either  the  sample  is  labeled  or  unlabeled.  But,  when  the  adversary  is
attacking, they send adversarial examples to the target to be misclassified. Regarding
the label of those samples, there are three different possibilities to consider. 
1. The target learns from an unlabeled adversarial example, resulting in adversarial
drift [31].
2. The  target  learns  the  true  label  of  an  adversarial  example,  resulting  in
adversarial training [32]. 
3. The target learns from an adversarial example with a false label, also resulting in
adversarial drift.
Adversarial training has already been shown to be vulnerable to black-box attacks in an
offline  setting.  Adversarial  training  in  an  online  setting  would  likely  be  an  effective
defense, however this scenario is unrealistic, since the adversary would not want the
target to know the true label. For this reason, we don’t consider it an option for this
experiment. The leaves the two cases which result in adversarial drift as viable options.
Based on the fact that it was the simpler test case, the first case (no label given) was
chosen for this experiment. The remaining option, where both the perturbation and a
false label are learned, is left to future research.
So, we needed a classifier that could learn from unlabeled samples. This meant
either an unsupervised or semi-supervised learner would be required. No research was
found regarding  existence of  unsupervised classifiers,  which  meant  we would  need
either an online or incremental semi-supervised learner. 
4.2 Usage of Cleverhans
Cleverhans is an adversarial machine learning library used for bench-marking both the
generating of adversarial  examples and the defenses against them  [20].  It  uses the
TensorFlow  framework  due  to  it’s  efficient  processing  of  graph  computations.  The
reasons for choosing this library were simple; this is the same library used by Papernot
et. al. in their paper which introduced the concepts of transferability, and it provides an
implemented example of their black-box experiment [6]. 
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In  it,  they  provide all  of  the  code needed train  a substitute,  craft  adversarial
examples, and evaluate those examples on the target model.  They also provide an
example  model  as  the  target  of  the  black-box  attack:  a  basic  convolutional  neural
network. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the authors make use of TensorFlow’s
graph and session workflow, which by default uses lazy evaluation. 
They do this by using placeholder objects in place of the actual data, meaning
that the graph of operations on the data is built symbolically. For example, this is a line
from the function “prep_bbox”: 
predictions = model.get_logits(x)
It appears to be a call on the model to get some set of predictions, given a sample set
x. However,  x is a placeholder variable. This means that the operation of getting the
predictions  from  the  model  is  added  to  the  computation  graph  for  x,  and  is  only
computed once data is fed into the graph using sess.run().
Because the ILP algorithm wasn’t implemented using TensorFlow operations, we
needed a way to integrate it into the computation graph. The solution was a wrapper
function from TensorFlow: tf.py_function. Very few places in the original example
were modified, since the goal was for our experiment to be as close to the original
example as possible. We did need to do additional formatting of the training data as
compared to the original; we needed to flatten the samples and argmax the array of
labels. Other than that, we just used the wrapper function to call the ILP Learner as if it
were the original black-box model from the example.
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4.3 Integration Architecture
The goal was to create an interface for the different types of learning functions we would
need for the experiment, namely offline and online learning. The implementation of the
ILP algorithm is  set  up  to  easily  configure  and  run  experiments  on  the  algorithm.
However, behind the scenes is a very involved configuration parsing process which is
used to initialize all of the major components needed for the algorithm to function. This
complicated the task of exposing the needed functionality, since the configuration and
learning processes were so intertwined. 
Our  solution  to  this  was  to  create  a  “configurator”  class  to  handle  the
configuration parsing, as well as the initial burn-in and training, and provide access to
the now-initialized model. The configurator needed to be initialized by our ILP Learner
object, and so it was passed three parameters: the name of the configuration file, the
name of the dataset, and the size of the datastore. However, the model was still not
ready for use. Once initialized, we needed to pass the configurator a set of samples to
perform  the  initial  training.  The  code  for  this  step  was  adapted  from  the  original
experiment “base.py”, with much of the logging taken out, as well as the performance
testing code which occurred every 1000 samples. Now that the model was initialized as
well, the ILP Learner was able to call the function getLearner() on the configurator to
retrieve the model.
With that access we could now create a class which could act as an interface for
the learner. For the ILP Learner itself, there were three functions which we needed to
implement in order to would allow the Cleverhans experiment to interface with the ILP
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model. These functions were get_predictions_offline(x), get_predictions_online(x),  and
get_predictions_batch(x).  The  input  for  the  three  functions  was  the  same:  a  set  of
samples in the form of a Tensor object. The output was also the same for all three: a
Tensor object containing the predictions for the input samples. For the offline function, it
computed the label predictions for those samples without learning from them. For the
online function, it iterated through the set of input samples, and for each samples it
would: predict it’s label, append the label to an array, and then learn from the sample.
Once the iteration finished. And for the batch function, the predictions for the labels
were made all at once and then the samples were iterated and learned one by one. In
each  case,  the  input  has  to  be  parsed  into  a  numpy ndarray  object  before  it  was
operated  upon,  and  converted  back  into  a  Tensor  object  before  it  was  returned.
TensorFlow contained built-in operations which made these conversions painless.
A diagram of this architecture is shown in Figure 4.1. With an interface for the ILP
algorithm and a wrapper function for the calls to that interface, the two libraries could be
integrated, and the experiment could commence.
Figure 4.1: Design used to expose needed learning functionality
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4.4 Experiment Setup
Before  the  experiment  proper,  we verified  to  our  satisfaction  that  the  ILP algorithm
works as advertised. We tested it against the MNIST dataset – both ILP and Cleverhans
have interfaces for using the dataset, and both were tested. We tested the algorithm
using different values for the tuning variables θ, kl , ku, and ratio_labeled, even trying to
purposely degrade it’s ability to learn. Despite all this, the algorithm quickly recovered
from this tampering after just a few thousand samples, with it’s performance falling in
line with that of a more optimal configuration. So we focused on the parameter which
had  the  most  impact:  the  number  of  initial  training  samples.  For  each  run  of  the
experiment, three different accuracies were calculated: 
• the black-box model on real samples
• the substitute model on real samples
• the black-box model on adversarial examples
It  should  be  noted  that  for  all  experiment  runs  which  used  the  ILP algorithm,  the
accuracy of the substitute model on real samples remained constant at 76.365%. For
this reason, it is excluded from the results.
The experiment comprised two testing variables: learning configuration and the
size of the training dataset for the black-box model. There were two main configurations
that we were interested in comparing: one that’s purely offline, and one where the black-
box model learns from the adversarial examples as they are given. We also tested a
third configuration, where the black-box model learns from the real test samples as well.
These three setups are labeled as “offline/offline”, “offline/online”, and “online/online”,
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respectively. Three values were chosen for the training dataset sample size (Ntrain): were
4k, 20k, and 40k.
4.5 Results
The test results for the ILP algorithm can be seen in Tables 4.1 - 4.2, with the difference
between them shown in Table 4.4 (Δacc). The results for the original algorithm are shown
in Table 4.3, with the difference between those accuracies shown in Table 4.4 as well.
There are several notable observations here. Looking at  Table 4.1,  we see that,  as
expected, the more samples the model learns from, the more accurate it is. But it is
interesting that there were no significant differences in the accuracy between the offline
and online tests against real samples. 
Table  4.2 is  where  we  find  the  results  which  would  possibly  confirm  our
hypothesis: whether or not learning while the adversary trains the substitute influences
the efficacy of the attack. If simply learning were enough, then it would be evident in the
“Offline/Offline” and “Offline/Online” cases. However, there is no significant difference
when comparing the two learning configurations. This means that it is not necessarily
the case that our hypothesis is correct. Regarding this, future research opportunities are







4,000 83.563% 83.563% 83.563%
20,000 91.137% 91.137% 91.137%
40,000 93.503% 93.503% 93.503%








4,000 65.555% 65.411% 65.411%
20,000 78.873% 78.741% 78.781%
40,000 83.919% 83.827% 83.827%
Table 4.2: Accuracy of the ILP algorithm on 
adversarial examples.
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The last notable observation taken from these results is found in Table 4.4, which
shows the difference between the accuracies in Tables 4.1 – 4.2 (after taking the row-
wise average) and the difference between the accuracies of the original example. The
incongruity  is  immediately  apparent;  as  the  training  set  grows,  the  ILP  algorithm
becomes  increasingly  resilient  against  the  adversarial  examples.  The  convolutional
neural net used in the original example, however, shows very little improvement in this
regard.




Table 4.3: Accuracy measurements for the 
original example. Left: accuracy of the black-
box learner on unaltered samples. Right:  
accuracy of the black-box learner on 
adversarial examples.




Table 4.4: Difference between the accuracy of 
the ILP algorithm (on left) and the original 
example (on right) between real samples and 
adversarial examples.
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES & CONCLUSION
5.1 Research Opportunities with Dynamic Defenses
First, There is currently no consistent language for describing dynamic modeling. As
noted earlier, there is ambiguity in this space  [24]; terms like “incremental” are used
interchangeably  with  “online”,  as  well  as  “lifelong”,  “evolutionary”,  and  “stream”.  A
taxonomy of dynamic modeling (or dynamic-adversarial approaches) would go a long
way in clarifying the language.  Second, the relationship between dynamic models and
the transferability of adversarial examples is in need of a theoretical foundation. While
Sethi et. al. provide some theoretical foundation on the properties of dynamic defenses,
it is an area which is just now being explored [23]. 
And lastly, there are plenty of research opportunities regarding the evaluation of
different dynamic models. We observed that one adjacent area of research to this is
dynamic  fuzzy  data  analysis  [33]–[36].  It  would  also  be  worthwhile  to  examine
transferability in the context of non-stationary and imbalanced data streams.
5.2 Sample Noise + Label Noise
In chapter 4, one of the options we presented as a test scenario was where the target
learns an adversarially perturbed sample with a false label. Examining the properties
that emerge when testing both sample noise and label noise together may yield insight
into the effects of different interactions of noise on a dynamic model. Some questions
we pose:
• Are certain models more vulnerable to one over the other?
• What is the relationship between sample and label noise regarding their effect on
the target’s decision boundary?
• To what degree does the error specificy of the attack influence the effectiveness
of the noise? 
• How would  the  decision  boundary  be affected when  sample  and  label  noise
target different classes?
• Would regularizing against sample noise impact the effectiveness of the label
noise, and vice versa?
5.3 Conclusion
The transferability of adversarial examples remains an intractable problem. Approaches
up till  now have focused on the offline case,  without  consideration for  the dynamic
nature of learning in an adversarial environment. This thesis echos the sentiment of
other recent publications: that a static model is not sufficient defend against adversarial
attacks. We show that the testing of transferable adversarial examples against dynamic
models  is  possible,  and  that  there  are  many  avenues  of  research  available.  Our
experiment showed that it is not necessarily the case that learning during an adversarial
attack  is  sufficient  to  impede  that  attack.  And  lastly,  we  assert  that  unification  of
terminology is necessary for continued research in this space.
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